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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review an order of the Utah Industrial 
Commission pursuant to §35-1-86 Utah Code Ann. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal for review of an Order of the Utah Industrial Commission. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented for review on appeal are as follows: 
i. Whether the Industrial Commission applied the proper 
Standard when entertaining Applicant's Motion for Review and 
on the Stipulation to Remand this matter for Review. 
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ii. Whether the Industrial Commission committed error by failing 
to construe the workers' compensation statute liberally in favor 
of the Applicant. 
iii. Whether the Industrial Commission's decision and order is 
supported by adequate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
iv. Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding that the 
Applicant's medical condition was not work related. 
v. Whether the petitioner's due process rights have been denied 
by virtue of the Commission's Findings of Fact or if the 
Findings are arbitrarily capricious or wholly without cause. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
PAGE NO, 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 5 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-86 5 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99 5 
Utah Code Ann. §63-43b-12 4, 8, 9, \0 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12 states as follows: 
(6)(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring 
review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be affirmed, 
reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the adjudicative 
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proceeding is to be remanded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial 
review available to aggrieved parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-86 states as follows: 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse, or annul any order of the 
commission, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution of any order. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 states as follows: 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the dependents of 
each such employee who is liked, by accident arising out of and in the course of his 
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-
inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or 
death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, 
in case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. The 
responsibility for compensation and payment of medical nursing, and hospital services 
and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the 
employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99 states, in part as follows: 
(1) If an employee claiming to have suffered an industrial accident in the service of 
his employer fails to give written notice within 180 calendar days to his employer or 
the commission of the time and place where the accident and injury occurred, and 
of the nature of the accident and injury, the employee's claim for benefits under this 
chapter is wholly barred. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On July 15,1991, the Petitioner was injured on the job while in the course and scope 
of her employment. On December 31,1991, the Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing 
for her Industrial Accident claim with the Industrial Commission. The petitioner claimed 
that while she was lifting trays into the dishwasher at chest level, she developed sudden pain 
in her shoulder. Petitioner asserts that her on-the-job activities, including washing dishes, 
lifting trays and an increased workload led to an injury to her shoulder. Petitioner suffered 
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a Torn Rotator Cuff. Defendant responded that Petitioner's medical condition is directly 
attributable to a pre-existing arthritic condition not attributable to an industrial accident or 
disease. 
A hearing was held on June 12, 1992. After hearing testimony and receiving a 
medical exhibit, the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) took the matter under 
advisement. Several letters were sent to the ALJ requesting a decision. On November 20, 
1992, (or 162 days post hearing) the Administrative Law Judge entered his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. The ALJ found that applicant had prior problems with her 
right arm and shoulder. The ALJ also found that applicant knew the workers compensation 
system very well having prior industrially related injuries, ie cut finger and back. That the 
applicant was released to return to work on November 4,1991. The applicant admitted she 
told her supervisor she suffers from arthritis. The ALJ found the applicant and her 
witnesses were not credible witnesses and that the defense witnesses were more credible. 
Based on these findings, the ALJ found that there is no connection between the applicant's 
shoulder problem and the alleged industrial accident. 
The applicant filed a Motion for Review and Request for Hearing on December 21, 
1992. The Industrial Commission entered it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
indicating there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's findings on 
credibility. That there is evidence that applicant complained of shoulder and arm pain on 
July 15,1991 and left work to seek medical attention. That the applicant suffered symptoms 
prior to the alleged incident of July 15, 1991. That the incident was not immediately 
reported to the employer and that applicant's treating physician attributed her complaints 
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to a recurrent condition for which she sought treatment. 
The Petitioner appealed this matter to the Court of Appeals. By Petitioner's Motion 
and Stipulation, the matter was remanded back to the Industrial Commission. The basis for 
the Remand is that all parties agreed that the Industrial Commission applied the wrong 
standard for determining Findings of Facts. The Industrial Commission must use the 
"preponderance of evidence" standard when entering it's Findings of Fact. 
On November 30, 1993, the Industrial Commission entered it's Order on Remand 
utilizing the exact same language in the prior Order Denying Motion for Review, except it 
inserts the following language: 
We will only overturn an ALJ's findings of fact if there is a compelling reason 
to do so, especially when the factual issues turn on questions of witness 
credibility. In this case, we find no compelling reason to overrule the ALJ's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law are well supported by a preponderance 
of the evidence in the record and hereby adopt them as our own. (emphasis 
added) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The Applicant asserts she is entitled to workers compensation benefits for having 
suffered an industrial injury on July 15, 1991 while in the course and scope of her 
employment. With an increase in work load, Applicant was lifting trays chest high to a 
dishwasher. She immediately felt a sharp shoulder pain, sufficient enough to cause her to 
cry. Immediately following the incident, she confronted her supervisor, Greg Coburn, and 
indicated she needed medical attention. In the hearing, Mr. Cobum testified that she was 
in pain, that she was crying, and that she was on the job when she confronted him. See 
pages 123,130 of Transcript. Mr. Coburn further testified the applicant needed immediate 
medical attention. 
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Another witness and employee of defendant, Penny Manchester, also saw applicant 
in tears on the day of the accident and verified she needed medical treatment. An accident 
report regarding the industrial injury was filled out by a supervisor on July 15, 1991. 
Applicant was immediately treated for her injury by Dr. David Curtis, a physician 
who is employed by Defendant. In his chart note August 8, 1991, Dr. Curtis indicates that 
applicant reported that the injury was industrially related. Dr. Curtis did not fill out a 
Physicians Report of Injury even though he was apprised that the medical condition was 
industrially related. 
An arthrogram was performed after the injury and found that she had a torn rotator 
cuff. Surgery was performed 14 days following the injury and the findings showed "an 
obvious large tear of the rotator cuff'. No prior medical report manifests a torn rotator cuff. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission mis-applied the standard for review when entering it's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying Motion for Review. The Industrial 
Commission must apply Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12 for the Motion for Review. It 
indicates that the Industrial Commission order shall contain the following: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring 
review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be affirmed, 
reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the adjudicative 
proceeding is to be remanded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial 
review available to aggrieved parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review. 
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The Industrial Commission did not follow Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12. It mis-
applied the standard of review by not entering proper Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law for each issue, by not designating the statute or rule permitting review, by not 
indicating the proper disposition of the case, and by disregarding substantial evidence 
indicating a compensable accident occurred. 
The Industrial Commission disregarded competent evidence in favor of unsubstantial 
contradictory evidence in finding that Applicant did not suffer a compensable injury. The 
Industrial Commission committed an error of law by when it placed too much emphasis on 
"credibility" when it should have construed the benefits in favor of compensability. McPhie 
v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977). 
Applicant's due process rights have been violated. She is entitled to an ALJ who is 
unbiased. Her due process rights have been violated when the AU's conduct prevented 
meaningful and impartial consideration of the evidence. Bunnell v. Industrial Commission, 
740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987). Anderson v. Industrial Commission. 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985). 
The Conclusions of Law are not supported by the facts. Neither the ALT nor the 
Commission entered adequate Findings to base a meaningful review. Finally, the 
Commission and the ALJ did not construe the facts in favor of compensability. McPhie. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
PROPER STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
The Industrial Commission mis-applied the standard of review. The Industrial 
Commission must enter it's own Findings of Fact. However, the Industrial Commission 
erred when it used the exact same language as it's Order Denying Motion for Review and 
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then substituted the new standard by stating: 
We will only overturn an ALTs findings of fact if there is a compelling reason 
to do so, especially when the factual issues turn on questions of witness 
credibility. In this case, we find no compelling reason to overrule the ALTs 
findings of fact and conclusions of law are well supported by a preponderance 
of the evidence in the record and hereby adopt them as our own. 
This case is similar to Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission. 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 
(1993). In Ashcroft, the Industrial Commission employed the phrase "substantial evidence" 
when reviewing the ALJ's decision. The Court of Appeals found in Ashcroft that "This is 
not the correct standard". That in order to prove compensability, the standard of 
"preponderance of the evidence" must be used. Id. at 50. 
There is a significant distinction between "preponderance of evidence" and 
"substantial evidence" and is not one of mere phraseology. Id. Substantial evidence is "such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion". 
Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1989). The Ashcroft case was 
remanded back to the Industrial Commission. This case should also be remanded as both 
Mrs. Featherstone and the Court of Appeals are "entitled to know that the proof was 
evaluated under the correct standard". Id. at 51. 
The Industrial Commission now wants to include a new higher standard, that of 
compelling evidence. Compelling is a higher standard than substantial, which the Industrial 
Commission used previously. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, indicates that the Agency Order 
must contain (iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; and (iv) conclusions of 
law as to each of the issues reviewed. In this case, the Administrative Agency did not enter 
it's own Findings, but rather issued a new standard, that of whether there is a compelling 
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reason to overturn the ALPs findings. 
THE FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE 
An administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of law that are 
adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review. Adams v. Board of Review, 
173 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (1991). The failure of an agency to make adequate findings of fact 
on material issues renders its findings "arbitrary and capricious". Nvrehn v. Industrial 
Commission, 800 P.2d 300, 335 (Utah App. 1990) cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly described the detail required in administrative findings 
in order to be considered adequate. See Adams at page 19. Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n. 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, the Industrial Commission merely summarized the medical records by 
stating that the injured employee "had a history of shoulder pain prior to July 15, 1991". 
That Dr. Green attributed the rotator cuff injury to the July 15, 1991 industrial incident. 
That Dr. Curtis made reference to "recurrent right shoulder pain" and "applicant believed 
her injury was associated to 'more heavy work'". The Industrial Commission then 
summarized the testimony. Even though a summary may be helpful, the Adams court 
specified that "A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in this case therefore does not 
give a clear indication of the ALPs or the Commission's view as to what in fact occurred. 
CREDIBILITY 
Credibility has been a major source of concern at the Industrial Commission level. 
The Commission must now realize that to merely decide a case based solely on credibility 
does not meet Constitutional muster. How difficult it can be for the Court of Appeals to 
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try to review orders of the Industrial Commission when the issues of fact are determined 
solely on bald and unsubstantiated statements. Ordinarily, the Commission and the 
reviewing Court accord great deference to the Administrative Law Judge. The policy of 
deference is predicated on the Judge's ability to personally observe the witness and evaluate 
first hand his or her demeanor. 
Although determination of a witness credibility is usually left to the discretion of the 
finder of fact, that discretion is not unlimited and can be abused. However, said abuse 
should be scrutinized carefully by this court. A judge is not at liberty, under the guise of 
passing upon credibility of a witness, to disregard his testimony when from no reasonable 
point of view is it open to doubt. Witnesses 81 Am Jur 2d §1034. Moreover, there is no 
reason for a trier of fact to determine the credibility of the testimony of a party where it is 
not contradicted by direct evidence, or by any legitimate inferences from the evidence, and 
it is not opposed to the probabilities, or in its nature surprising or suspicious. 
A standard for when credibility may be used at issue in Findings of Fact must be 
made be determined by this Court. Credibility should not be at issue until there is 
materially conflicting testimony and/or evidence. Materially conflicting evidence is such that 
would affect the outcome of the matter. Immaterial conflicting evidence should not be the 
basis for denying benefits. Moreover, if a materially conflict issue is raised, in order to 
comply with Adams, the Industrial Commission must make adequate and complete 
disclosure of why credibility is an issue, why the issue is material, determine the conflicting 
evidence and how it resolves the issue. 
In this case, the ALT chose insignificant, immaterial and irrelevant facts to illustrate 
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his preconceived belief that the Applicant and all her witnesses lacked credibility. The A U 
made the simple finding that "Considering all the foregoing, the Administrative Law Judge 
finds that the applicant is not a credible witness". The A U justifies his summarizing 
testimony that applicant told a supervisor that she had arthritis, that pain prevented her 
from working, that she applied for unemployment benefits, that she knew the workers 
compensation system well, that she had prior problems with her right arm and shoulder and 
that she chose to retire. All of these determinations are immaterial. The A U completely 
ignored material testimony and facts that 1) there was an increased workload, 2) that 
applicant performed her duties well up to the date of the injury, 3) that her supervisor found 
her in intense and immediate pain, 4) that her supervisor indicated she needed immediate 
medical treatment, 5) that a co-worker verified an injury occurred and 6) there is now a torn 
rotator cuff when previously there was not. 
The Industrial Commission makes the following unsubstantiated bald statements in 
order to justify denial of benefits: 
The ALT determined that the applicant was not credible based upon 
his observation of the witnesses and the inconsistencies between the 
applicant's testimony and the evidence contained in the medical records. The 
ALT further found that Penny Manchester added no factual support to the 
applicant's case and that the applicant's husband was an antagonistic, biased 
and argumentative witness who was neither credible nor reliable. 
There is no support in the Order justifying the credibility, the observations or the 
inconsistencies. Both the Applicant's witness, Penny Manchester, and the Defendant's 
witness, Greg Coburn verified that on the day of the accident, they witnessed the Applicant 
in pain, crying and in need of medical attention. This supports the fact that the Applicant 
was injured on the job. The Industrial Commission finds on page three, that the applicant's 
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husband testified that his wife was in more pain after July 15,1991 than she was before and 
she could clean or cook supper after the incident. The statements by the Industrial 
Commission that the applicant's husband was antagonistic, biased and argumentative from 
this Findings are unjustified and illogical. Clearly, the statements by the Industrial 
Commission do not comply with Adams as we do not have any basis for why it believes the 
husband was antagonistic, biased and argumentative.. 
In Baker v. Industrial Commission, 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965) the Utah Supreme 
Court had its first occasion to comment directly on the use of credibility determinations in 
workers' compensation cases. In that case, the Industrial Commission had denied 
compensation, sustaining an Administrative Law Judge's denial of benefits on the basis of 
the Applicant's alleged lack of credibility. The Suprepie Court in reversing, held in part as 
follows: 
We believe that the Commission as a fact finder acted as it did 
because apparently it disbelieved uncontroverted testimony of 
witnesses whose interest was in no way shown or inferable, 
which carried a reasonable measure of conviction, and there 
was noting in the record which intrinsically would discredit the 
testimony or be indicative of witness demeanor that would give 
the Commission an advantage over the Court in its 
determination. The Commission's Order recited testimony of 
the Applicant which seems to be taken out of context, without 
considering the record as a whole. 
We think that the critical question here is whether the 
Commission arbitrarily can discount all competent, 
uncontradicted evidence. We think it can't, but did so here, 
calling for reversal. 
There is no lack of evidence or anything in the record to reflect 
incredibility on the part of the Applicant or her witnesses, 
unless, on uncontroverted testimony we arbitrarily say six 
persons, under penalty of perjury, were all prevaricators. 
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The Baker Court noted that the purpose of the Industrial Compensation Act was to 
alleviate hardships upon workers and their families, and that the facts and inferences 
therefrom constituting a worker's right to recover are to be liberally construed and went on 
to hold that allegations of incredibility "must at least be supported by the record and by 
accurate findings of fact". 615. See also McPhie. As in this case, there is no evidence in the 
record to reflect incredibility on the part of the Applicant or her witnesses. 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
In Adams v. Board of Review, 173 Utah Adv. Rep. 18. (1991) the Court of Appeals 
found that "An administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of law that 
are adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review". The Court then cited 
Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission. 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990) when it stated: 
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the 
Commission, the findings must be "sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusions on each factual issue was reached. The 
failure of an agency to make adequate findings of fact on 
material issues renders it findings "arbitrary and capricious". 
There are two facets to determine whether there is a compensable injury. The first 
is medical causation. Renowned Dr. Green indicated that her medical condition is related 
to her employment. Dr. Curtis, the defendant's employee, indicates that applicant attributes 
her condition to increase workload. The second facet is legal causation. Neither the ALT 
nor the Commission analyzed this aspect in any depth. The failure to make adequate 
findings renders the decision arbitraiy and capricious. Nvrehn. The Court of Appeals cannot 
review the record meaningfully. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should remand this matter back to the 
Industrial Commission for further hearing. 
Dated this day of April, 1994. 
Davi<TW. Parker 
Attorney for Appellant 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 3 00 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on June 
12, 1992 at 1:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
The Honorable Donald L, 
Judge. 
George, Administrative Law 
The applicant, Jennie Featherstone, was present and 
represented by David Parker, Attorney at Law. 
The defendant employer, Tooele Valley Regional, and 
its insurer, Utah Local Government Trust were 
represented by David L. Church, Attorney at Law. 
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund was represented by 
its Administrator, Erie V. Boorman, Attorney at 
Law. 
An Application for Hearing requesting medical expenses, 
permanent partial and temporary partial disability compensation, 
interest, travel expenses and reserving the issue of permanent and 
total disability was filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah 
on December 31, 1991, wherein the applicant, Jennie M. 
Featherstone, alleges that she sustained an injury by accident 
arising out of or -in the course of her employment with the 
defendant employer, Tooele Valley Regional, on July 15, 1991. That 
Application was assigned case number 92-079, a copy was sent to the 
defendant employer, an Answer thereto timely filed, and accordingly 
the matter was scheduled for hearing before the Industrial 
Commission of Utah on June 12, 1992. 
JENNIE M. FEATHERSTONE 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
Beyond the benefits applied for, the defendants7 position was 
that no industrial accident had occurred, and in the alternative, 
if an industrial accident were found, legal causation would have to 
be overcome as well. Credibility was deemed to be a major issue. 
The applicant testified that on the day of the alleged 
industrial accident, July 15, 1991, she was working at her job as 
a dishwasher for Tooele Valley Regional. She stated that she moved 
12 trays (which are weighed at 1 pound 13 ounces each) and felt a 
stabbing pain in her arm and shoulder. 
Later when her supervisor, Greg came in, she was reportedly 
crying, he asked what was wrong and she said she had to go to the 
doctor. 
Previous to this in April, 1991, the applicant had another 
industrial accident where she picked up a tray of milk in a walk-in 
freezer, hurt her low back, and reported that. 
Dr. Curtis treated her for this July accident by telling her 
to take a few days off. When she returned to work around the end 
of October or the end of November, she asked for and was put on as 
a "cold cook" but represented that she was not able to handle it 
for more than 4 days because lifting above her head was necessary 
and she couldn't do it. She stated that she could not return to 
dishwashing because it was too hard on her arm. 
On July 30, 1991, she reports surgery for a rotator cuff 
repair, but still complained of pain after that procedure. 
The applicant specifically stated that on the date of the 
industrial accident, in addition to talking to supervisor, Greg, 
she had also talked to her direct supervisor, Opal, about the 
incident, but no report was filled out. 
On cross-examination, the applicant acknowledged shoulder 
problems prior to 1987. She also at first did not recall an 
appointment with Dr. Curtis for this condition on June 20, 1991, 
then acknowledged that she did. As to her July 15, 1991, visit 
with Dr. Curtis, the medical records do not show any notations 
indicating an industrial accident. The applicant acknowledged 
filing out an industrial accident claim for the April, 1991, 
incident, and stated that on July 15, 1991, no report was made out 
because she was in too much pain. 
The applicant admitted that her leg pain was what prevented 
her from doing the "cold cook" job, not her shoulder. The 
applicant disagreed with Dr. Curtis' notes after the surgery which 
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indicated that she had full range of motion and good strength. 
When she went to Dr. Greene for a second opinion, she stated that 
he did not relate to her pain* 
The applicant admitted knowing the reporting procedure, 
because it had been explained to her and because she had done so on 
the prior industrial accident. 
In support of her application, the applicant called as a 
second witness, Penny Manchester, who did not witness the 
industrial accident, but said the applicant approached her on that 
day, told the witness that her arm was hurting and asked Manchester 
to work for her, to which she agreed. Manchester's testimony shed 
no light, and appeared to be straining to support the applicant's 
position. 
The applicant presented her husband as her third and final 
witness, who acknowledged that his wife had arthritis, and recited 
a litany of worsened symptoms after the alleged industrial 
accident. He was however, clearly biased, argumentative, exhibited 
selective favorable recall, was angry with Dr. Curtis for allegedly 
not turning in the industrial accident reporting paper work until 
a month and a half after, thereby damaging the applicant's cause; 
he also disagreed with Dr. Curtis of full range of motion. 
The defendants presented as their first witness, insurance 
adjuster, Marilyn Beesley, who had talked with the applicant on 
August 7, 1991, when the applicant called Beesley about her denial 
letter to Dr. Curtis on August 6th. In that conversation, the 
applicant was requesting Beesley to reconsider her denial, and 
stated that her shoulder was giving her the problem all along 
[since the prior industrial accident]. There was no mention of 
July 15th or this alleged second industrial accident. On cross-
examination, Beesley stated that she investigated further, and no 
report had been made to the employer by the applicant concerning 
the July 15th incident• 
The defendant's second witness was Greg Coburn, the director 
of material management and food services who stated that he did 
observe the applicant in tears and that she stated that she could 
not work and left. No industrial accident was reported to him at 
that time, and he was surprised when it was later turned in as an 
industrial accident. 
Coburn testified that contrary to the applicants statement 
that she had reported this injury to Opal West on July 15th, which 
was a Monday, Opal West did not work on Mondays, and when he 
checked specifically as to the July 15th time sheet, West was off. 
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Defendant's third witness was Diane Moore, who was the 
applicant's direct supervisor on the date of the alleged injury. 
She testified that the applicant did approach her around 9:30 or 
10:00 a.m., and stated that she had to leave to go to the doctor 
because her shoulder and arm ached. The applicant did not say 
anything about an industrial accident at that time, and had 
previously complained of shoulder pain, and taken time off. 
On cross-examination, it was brought up that the applicant had 
complained to Moore several times of her arm hurting because of 
arthritis, but on August 29th, the applicant reported it as an 
industrial accident. 
Testimony ended. 
Having reviewed the file, the exhibits, and further having had 
an opportunity to observe the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, 
the Administrative is now prepared to make the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The applicant had problems with her right arm and shoulder 
long before the alleged industrial accident of July 15, 1991, 
complained of it to the doctors, and received treatments which 
included shots up to five years previous. The medical records on 
page 101, dated May 22, 1991, indicate increasing shoulder pain. 
That is followed on June 20, 1991, by the notation that the 
applicant " . . . has complained of this over the past 3 years." 
2. The applicant knew the industrial accident reporting 
system well, having done so previously on February 11, 1985, when 
she cut her finger; December 21, 1984, when she burned her 
forearm; November 7, 1990, when she cut her finger on a pot, and 
the last mentioned incident of April 16, 1991, where she allegedly 
hurt her back. Yet, when she claims to have an unwitnessed 
industrial accident on July 15, 1991, by her own testimony, she did 
not report to Greg. She did, however, claim that she reported it 
to Opal, who was not even present on that day (to the detriment of 
the applicant's credibility), further the applicant did not mention 
an industrial accident in her visit to Dr. Curtis that same day, 
nor did she follow through in reporting the matter at all until 
August 29th or after, when she had been denied medical expenses. 
3. The applicant was released to return to work on November 
4, 1991, but chose to retire on 11/10/91, and admitted that her leg 
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pain was what prevented her from doing the "cold cook" work, not 
her shoulder. Further, on November 14, 1991, the applicant applied 
for unemployment benefits, stating only that she had back and leg 
pain, with no mention of her shoulder. 
4. The applicant admitted that she told supervisor Greg 
Coburn that it was arthritis, and an x-ray report of July 18, 1991, 
does show degenerative joint disease, 
5. Considering all the foregoing, the Administrative Law 
Judge finds that the applicant is not a credible witness. 
6. As to the applicant's second witness, Penny Manchester, 
factually she added nothing, but was obviously attempting to 
support the applicant's cause, but not convincingly. 
7. The applicant's husband was an antagonistic,, biased 
witness on the applicant's behalf, argumentative, attacking Dr. 
Curtis on various grounds, and having bursts of sudden favorable 
recall. His testimony is neither credible nor reliable. 
8. The ALJ finds the defense witnesses to be more credible 
than those of the applicant. Their testimony and the medical 
records are clear that the applicant had previously existing 
problems with her arm and shoulder, and when she left on the day of 
the alleged industrial incident, she gave no indication whatsoever 
that this was an industrial accident, and thereafter did not report 
it as such for another 6 weeks. 
9. There is no connection between the applicant's shoulder 
problem and the alleged industrial accident of July 15, 1991, nor 
with the applicant's prior industrial injury of April, 1991, nor 
her low back problems. 
10. The applicant was not involved in a compensable industrial 
accident on July 15, 1991. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant, Jennie M. Featherstone, has failed to show by 
a preponderance of credible evidence that an industrial accident 
occurred on July 15, 1991, and accordingly she is not entitled to 
workers compensation benefits. 
Good cause appearing herein, the Administrative Law Judge 
hereby issues the following: 




IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of the applicant, 
Jennie M. Featherstone, for medical expenses, temporary total 
disability, temporary partial disability, permanent partial 
disability, interest, travel and permanent total disability 
benefits as a result of a July 15, 1991, incident, should be and 
the same is hereby denied and dismissed with prejudice* 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (3 0) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal* 
INDUSTRIAL. COMMISSION OF UTAH 
>£ 
Donald L. George 
Administrative Law Judge 
Certified this .^pirX) day of Wr**. , 1992, 
ATTEST: 
Patricia O. Ashb; 
Commission Secret' taxv_^7 
*NWkV>V 
EXHIBIT B 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
David W. Parker (5125) 
Attorney for Applicant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 260 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone No.: (801) 328-5600 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
JENNIE M. FEATHERSTONE 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TOOELE VALLEY REGIONAL and 
UTAH LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRUST and 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND 
Defendant. ] 
) MOTION FOR REVIEW AND 
) REQUEST FOR HEARING 
I Case No.: 92-079 
Applicant, by and through her attorney, David W. Parker, 
hereby moves the Industrial Commission to review the decision of 
the Administrative Law Judge rendered on November 20, 1992 in the 
above-entitled matter. The Applicant also moves that all matters 
pertaining to the above case immediately be set for hearing before 
the Industrial Commission. This Motion is brought on the following 
basis: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Applicant asserts she is entitled to workers 
compensation benefits for having suffered an industrial injury on 
July 15, 1991 while in the course and scope of her employment. 
2. Immediately following the incident, she confronted her 
supervisor, one Greg Coburn and indicated she needed medical 
attention. 
3. In the hearing, Mr. Coburn testified that she was in 
pain, that she was crying, and that she was on the job when she 
confronted him. It was testified to by both Mr. Coburn and the 
applicant that applicant needed immediate medical attention. 
4. Another witness and employee of defendant, Penny 
Manchester, also saw applicant in tears on the day of the accident 
and verified she needed medical treatment. 
5. An accident report regarding the industrial injury was 
filled out by a supervisor on July 15, 1991. See exhibit A. 
6. Applicant was immediately treated for her injury by Dr. 
David Curtis, a physician who is also employed by Defendant. 
7. Dr. Curtis did not fill out a Physicians Report of Injury 
even though he was apprised that the medical condition was 
industrially related. 
8. In his chart note August 8, 1991, Dr. Curtis indicates 
that applicant reported that the injury was industrially related. 
9. An arthrogram was performed after the injury and found 
that she had a torn rotator cuff. 
10. Surgery was performed 14 days following the injury and 
the findings showed "an obvious large tear of the rotator cuff". 
No prior medical report manifests a torn rotator cuff. 
11. Following the hearing, the Judge took the matter under 
advisement. 
12. Because no decision was made after an extraordinary lapse 
of time, numerous calls and letters were sent to Judge George. The 
requests concerned the rendering of a decision and whether he 
needed any additional information to assist him in deciding the 
case. No additional information was requested by the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
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13. On November 20, 1992, or 162 days following the hearing, 




The Administrative Law Judge is considered the trier of fact 
in these proceedings. The trier of fact can look at credibility of 
witnesses only when credibility is in issue. "There is no reason 
for having the (trier of fact) determine credibility of the 
testimony of a party . . . where it is not contradicted by direct 
evidence, or by any legitimate inferences from the evidence, and it 
is not opposed to probabilities or in it's nature surprising or 
suspicious." 81 Am. Jur. 2d Section 1035. The ALJ, in this case, 
did not include any material rational behind his determination of 
credibility issues. Moreover, he did not manifest any 
contradiction of direct evidence, showed any contrary inferences or 
nature of suspicions. Therefore, credibility cannot be at issue. 
The ALJ cannot use his own personal subjectivity and opinion 
about the applicant without taking into account all of the direct 
and uncontroverted evidence. "The trial judge, . . • is not at 
liberty, under the guise of passing upon the credibility of a 
witness to disregard his testimony when no reasonable point of view 
is open to doubt." 81 Am Jur 2d 1034. Moreover, the mere fact 
that a witness is somehow involved in a case does not mean that his 
testimony, ipso facto, must be disbelieved. See Findings No. 7. 
Rather, all of the testimony and direct evidence must be weighed. 
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See 81 Am Jur 2d 1031. Even though the trier of fact may be free 
to disbelieve the testimony of an interest witness, it may not make 
an affirmative finding that the exact opposite of his testimony is 
true if there is no evidence to support such a finding. See 81 Am 
Jur 2d 1036 (Reminder). 
The Administrative Law Judge's findings are clearly erroneous. 
The findings are neither supported by testimony nor medical 
evidence. He also claims that the applicant is not a credible 
witness, that the applicant's witnesses are not credible and that 
the defense witnesses are more credible. Yet the Testimony 
elicited from defendants witnesses and the medical records 
corroborate applicant's claim. The judges decision making process 
is non seguitur in nature. He has failed to adequately weigh all 
of the evidence. The findings go against the clear weight of 
evidence as required in Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (1989). 
The findings have no merit and have no relationship to the material 
issues of whether the applicant suffered a compensable injury. 
Therefore, the findings must be set aside and a hearing must be 
held in this matter for proper findings. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
The Administrative Law Judge findings were not supported by 
the testimony. Testimony by the applicant indicated that she 
suffered an industrial injury while in the course and scope of her 
employment. Indeed, she testified that she was loading a 
dishwasher with trays when she injured her shoulder. The accident 
was an identifiable, unanticipated event. She was subject to an 
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unreasonable risk not associated with everyday life. The 
supervisor also testified that immediately following the accident, 
applicant reported the injury to him. He observed the applicant 
crying and in need of medical attention. A fellow employe 
testified she witnessed the applicant in pain and crying. Another 
supervisor had filled out the accident report on the day in 
question. No testimony was elicited or documents produced to 
indicate that the Applicant did not suffer an injury on the day in 
question, nor any day thereafter. 
The Administrative Law Judge's findings were not supported by 
medical evidence. Prior to the accident, the applicant was treated 
by Dr. Curtis. Dr. Curtis' records shows she was seen for an 
evaluation on January 14, 1988. Dr. Curtis expected her to regain 
full function. The next note specifies a "biceps rupture". The 
next note designates shoulder impingement (March 24, 1988). The 
chart note on June 16, 1988 manifests applicant is "getting along 
well with her shoulder". The last note prior to the industrial 
injury asserts only that "Jennie presents for evaluation of her 
shoulders". Dr. Curtis states that "I will plan to see her back 
prn". On the day of the industrial injury, Dr. Curtis found pain 
over the "anterior acromial region". He then took her off work. 
On July 19, 1991, an MRI was performed and found "There is a 
prominently abnormal appearance of the supraspinatus muscle and 
tendon in that there is increased signal, particularly on the T2 
weighted images in the area of the distal supraspinatus tendon 
consistent with a complete tear of the supraspinatus tendon with 
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retraction of the tendon noted" and "there is evidence of injury 
and abnormality of the biceps tendon as well". The report clearly 
asserts a new injury while recognizing degenerative and pre-
existing medical conditions. 14 days following the accident, an 
arthrogram and arthroscopy was performed which found an "obvious 
large tear of the rotator cuff. No rotator cuff tear was ever 
found previously. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONTRARY TO LAW 
By law, the findings are arbitrary and capricious. The 
administrative law judge did not follow the mandate of Adams v. 
Board of Review, 173 Utah Adv. Rep 18, (1991). In Adams, the Court 
of Appeals indicates that "The commission could not logically 
conclude that Adam's medical condition, if any, was not caused by 
her employment without first establishing what her medical 
condition was". In this case, the Administrative Law Judge did not 
make any finding as to the medical condition. Because of such, the 
Findings of Fact are defective. 
The findings of fact issued by the Administrative Law Judge 
are irrelevant and immaterial to the issues at hand. Adams 
requires that "An administrative agency must make findings of fact 
and conclusions of law that are adequately detailed so as to permit 
meaningful appellate review. The failure of an agency to make 
adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its findings 
"arbitrary and capricious". The ALJ indicates in his findings that 
the applicant chose to retire, that her husband was argumentative, 
that she had arthritis, and that she applied for unemployment 
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benefits. All of these findings lend nothing to the issues at hand 
about whether the applicant suffered a compensable industrial 
accident and whether legal and medical causation has been proven. 
APPLICANT HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED BY THE ALJ'S DECISION 
Applicant is seeking her exclusive remedy under workers' 
compensation law. She has no other remedy for the injuries that 
she suffered while in the course and scope of her employment. The 
Findings of Fact are defective, arbitrary and capricious. Because 
of the ALJ's findings, the Applicant is substantially prejudiced 
and cannot recover any workers7 compensation benefits. The denial 
directly affects her ability to obtain lawful compensation and 
medical treatment for her injuries. 
The Administrative Law Judge unreasonably delayed rendering a 
decision. The hearing was set for June 12, 1992. 162 days 
following the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued his 
order. The Administrative Law Judge did not need any additional 
information, nor requested additional information from either 
party. Counsel for Applicant repeatedly contacted the 
Administrative Law Judge to render a decision. The ALJ was haunted 
by the unreasonable delay and frequent and warranted requests for 
decision. This precipitated an impulsive and unsubstantiated 
denial of applicant's benefits. 
THE ORDER IS FLAWED 
The Applicant has a compensable injury. An injury is 
compensable if the applicant can show that she is injured while in 
the course and scope of her employment. The applicant testified, 
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which testimony was supported and uncontradicted, that she suffered 
an on-the-job injury. Dr. Curtis, a physician who is employed by 
defendants, was notified of the injurY and treated her. The 
applicant reported to Dr. Curtis that the injury was industrially 
related. The medical records indicate that she did not suffer a 
torn rotator cuff previously and that this is a new injury. The 
injury occurred within the course and scope of her employment as 
attested to by all parties. 
The applicant's prior medical problems do not relate to the 
current medical problems. The defendants assert that this case 
should be decided under the Allen test. Allen should not apply in 
that there has been no evidence produced by the defendants that the 
applicant's prior medical problems contributed to or were related 
to the current industrial injury. The fact that there is a pre-
existing medical problem does not presume to invoke the Allen test. 
Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission, 146 Utah Adv. Rpt. 53 (1990). The 
Employer must prove medically that the claimant suffers from a pre-
existing condition which contributes to the injury at hand. See 
Nyrehn. If the condition contributes to the injury at hand, an 
aggravation of a pre-existing condition is compensable if applicant 
can meet the higher standard set out by Allen. 
However, even if Allen applied, the injury would be 
compensable. Allen is not designed to deny employees from 
benefits. It is designed to offset the pre-existing condition of 
the employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating 
claims for impairments resulting from personal risk rather than 
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exertions at work. You will note that much of the uncontroverted 
testimony manifests that there was an unusually large amount of 
work performed by the kitchen staff. The applicant and kitchen 
crew were burdened with additional work. This additional work was 
caused by the Hospital taking on the contract to serve additional 
meals for the jail inmates. The applicant testified, which 
testimony was uncontroverted and also supported by other witnesses, 
that the injury was an unexpected cause of injury and unexpected 
result of the exertion. Claimant also testified, which testimony 
was supported by other witnesses that her unusual exertion led to 
her injury and should be compensable. She also testified that her 
injury is the direct and natural result of her working activities 
at Defendant's locale. See Nyrehn. 
The medical records support the industrial accident. Prior to 
the industrial accident, the applicant was being treated by 
Defendants' employee, Dr. Curtis. Dr. Curtis found medical 
conditions concerning the biceps and arthritic conditions. Prior 
to the industrial injury, he was not treating applicant for a torn 
rotator cuff. The applicant needed medical treatment on the day of 
the industrial accident. Following the accident, the doctor found 
a torn rotator cuff. Clearly, this is related to the accident in 
question. 
The Applicant reported the injury properly to the employer. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-1 et seq. requires only that the 
employee notify the employer of the injury. Utah Code Ann. Section 
35-1-99 requires that the injury must be reported within 180 days 
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of the date of accident. If the employer files an "Employers 
Report of Injury" then notice is considered proper and the statute 
is tolled. The supervisors all admit that they knew of injury 
either the day of, or immediately following the accident. The 
Insurance adjustor admits that she knew of the injury within a 
couple weeks of the accident. There is a document indicating that 
the supervisor filled out an accident report the day of the 
accident. Therefore proper notice was given to the employer for 
this accident. 
CONCLUSION 
The Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact are arbitrary 
and capricious by law. The testimony and medical documents do not 
substantiate a denial of workers compensation benefits. They do 
not justify a conclusion that no compensable injury occurred. The 
findings are based solely on a recitation of conflicting testimony. 
In the Adams case, the Court of Appeals indicates that "a mere 
summary of the conflicting evidence. . . does not give a clear 
indication of the A.L.J, s or the Commission's view as to what in 
fact occurred". The failure to have adequate findings of facts are 
considered arbitrary and capricious. These arbitrary and 
capricious findings substantially prejudiced the applicant in that 
she is completely denied her benefits under the Workers 
Compensation Act. Any doubt respecting the right to compensation 
must be resolved in Applicant's favor. McPhie v. Industrial 
Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (1977). Therefore, applicant's injury on 
July 15, 1991 must be determined as compensable. The Findings of 
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Fact as outlined by the Administrative Law Judge must be reversed 
and this case must be remanded for further hearing. 
Dated this day of December, 1992. 
David W. Parker 
Attorney for Applicant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, hereby certify that I mailed, postage pre-paid, true and 
correct copies of the foregoing document(s) this day of 
December, 1992, 
TO: 
Jennie M. Featherstone 
428 East 300 North 
Tooele Utah 84074 
David L. Church, Esq. 
51 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt lake City, Utah 84111 
Erie V. Boorman, Esq., 
Administrator of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Adjudication Division 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I, hereby certify that I hand-delivered, true and correct 
copies of the foregoing document(s) this day of December, 
1992, 
TO: 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Adjudication Division 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
DAVID W. PARKER 
11 
EXHIBIT C 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR REVIEW 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 





Tooele Valley Regional and/or * 
Utah Local Government Trust and * 




The Industrial Commission of Utah issues this order pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-78 and Section 63-46b-12. 
The applicant timely filed this motion for review of the 
administrative law judge's ("ALJ") order dated November 20, 1992. 
Said order denied the applicant's claim for workers' compensation 
benefits pursuant to an alleged July 15, 1991 industrial accident. 
The applicant asserts that the ALJ improperly based his 
decision on credibility when the testimony of the applicant and her 
witnesses was not contradicted by other witnesses or other evidence 
in the record. She further asserts that the ALJ's findings of fact 
are clearly erroneous and are not supported by the evidence in the 
record. 
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (flUAPAff) , an 
ALJ's findings of fact will be sustained if the findings are 
supported by "substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the court." U.C.A. 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1992). 
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence 
... though "something less than the weight of the evidence." Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Ut. App. 1989) 
quoting Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). In its 
discussion of review of agency factfinding, the court noted that it 
would "not substitute its judgment as between two reasonable 
conflicting views," even if the court may have reached a different 
conclusion had the matter come before them on de novo review. 
Grace Drilling at 68. 
We will apply the substantial evidence test to the ALJ's 
findings of fact, recognizing that the ALJ was present at the 
hearing and was better able to observe the testimony and demeanor 
of the witnesses and to evaluate their credibility than the 
commission on its review of the record. We have reviewed the tape 
of the hearing in order to better assess the conformity of the 
ALJ's findings with the taped testimony. 
Review of the medical records exhibit shows that the applicant 
had a history of shoulder pain prior to July 15, 1991, the date of 
the alleged industrial accident. Medical Records Exhibit, pp. 
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00027, 00033, 00045, 00053, 00056, 00058, 00101, 00118, 00119, 
00122. Dr. Mark Greene, however, opined that the applicants 
rotator cuff injury which has been attributed to the alleged July 
15, 1991 industrial accident, was different from the applicant's 
1987 shoulder pain and bursitis. Medical Records Exhibit, p. 
00001. 
The progress notes of Dr. David E. Curtis, the applicant's 
treating physician, make reference to the applicant's "recurrent" 
right shoulder pain. Medical Records Exhibit, p. 00027. Dr. 
Curtis offered no opinion regarding the causal connection between 
the applicant's rotator cuff tear and her employment, although he 
did note that the applicant believed that her injury was associated 
with "more heavy work at her dishwashing job, especially taking 
care of the trays which come from the jail." Medical Records 
Exhibit, p. 00033. It is important to note that the applicant's 
medical records indicate that she suffered the pain, popping and 
grinding in her shoulder that she attributes to the industrial 
accident before the alleged accident occurred. Medical Records 
Exhibit, p. 00027. 
At the hearing, the applicant testified that on July 15, 1991, 
she picked up 12 serving trays to place them in the dishwasher and 
felt extreme pain "like her arm was being pulled out of the 
socket." She told Food Services Manager Greg Coburn that her arm 
hurt and she needed to go see her doctor. Later that day, the 
applicant saw her treating physician, Dr. Curtis. Dr. Curtis 
diagnosed a rotator cuff tear, but did not tell the applicant that 
the injury predated the July 15, 1991 incident. With regard to 
seeing Dr. Green for a second opinion, the applicant testified that 
he told her that the 1991 rotator cuff injury was different from 
her preceding shoulder problems. Dr. Green gave the applicant no 
recommended course of treatment that she could recall, but she 
testified that she "told him what she needed to have done and he 
did it." Hearing Tape # 1 at 1275. 
In addition, the applicant testified that she talked to Greg 
and her supervisor, Opal West, on July 15, 1991 after the alleged 
industrial accident. On cross examination, the applicant stated 
that she believed she had been treated for arthritis in her 
shoulder with cortisone shots prior to the accident. She testified 
that prior to July 15, 1991, she suffered from severe shoulder 
pain, popping and grinding. However, she didn't remember telling 
Dr. Curtis about the pain, grinding and popping during her June 20, 
1991 visit to the doctor. See Medical Records Exhibit at 00027. 
The applicant further testified that when she suffered an 
industrial injury to her low back in April 1991, she filled out an 
accident report and reported to the emergency room per hospital 




"hurt too much" and she didn't think about filling out an accident 
report or going to the emergency room. Instead, she left work 
early at about 9:00 a.m. to see her treating physician, Dr. Curtis. 
The applicant stated that she initially thought her shoulder pain 
was caused by arthritis, but later after she discovered there were 
torn ligaments, she decided the injury must have resulted from 
lifting the trays at work. 
Penny Manchester, one of the applicant's co-workers, testified 
that the applicant asked her to work for her on July 15, 1991. The 
applicant appeared to be in a great deal of pain and was crying 
when she asked Ms. Manchester to work for her. Ms. Manchester also 
testified that Opal West was working on July 15, 1991. 
Charles Featherstone, the applicant's husband of three years, 
testified that before the alleged accident of July 15, 1991, the 
applicant kept the house clean and always had supper ready when he 
came home. After the accident, the house wasn't clean and supper 
was "soup and sandwiches." Mr. Featherstone stated that his wife 
seemed to be in more pain after July 15, 1991 than she was before 
that date. He did not go with his wife to her June and July 1991 
appointments with Dr. Curtis, so he did not know what the doctor 
told her. 
Marilyn Beesley, an insurance adjuster for the Utah Local 
Government Trust, testified that she was the adjuster for the 
applicant's April 16, 1991 lower back industrial claim. She 
received a request for approval of shoulder surgery to be charged 
to the April 16, 1991 claim. Payment for the surgery was denied by 
letter dated August 6, 1991 because there was nothing in her file 
on the April 16, 1991 accident to support payment for the shoulder 
surgery. The applicant called Ms. Beesley on August 7, 1991 to 
request that she reconsider the denial of benefits. During this 
conversation, the applicant did not mention a second accident in 
July 1991. Ms. Beesley talked to the respondent in early August to 
find out how the shoulder injury related to the accident in April 
1991. The employer representative, Beth Bowles, indicated that she 
did not know why the applicant had surgery. An employer's first 
report of injury for the alleged July 15, 1991 accident was 
received by the carrier on August 30, 1991. 
Greg Coburn, the Director of Materials Management and Food 
Services for the respondent testified that the applicant did not 
tell him on July 15, 1991 that she had an industrial accident but 
told him that her shoulder and arm hurt and she needed to leave. 
The applicant had not mentioned her shoulder pain to him prior to 
July 15, 1991. Mr. Coburn testified that Opal West was not working 
on July 15, 1991. He stated that Opal regularly had Mondays off, 
and that July 15, 1991 was a Monday. He also checked the work 




Moore was the supervisor on July 15, 1991. Mr. Coburn saw the 
applicant on August 29, 1991 when she came in to file an employer's 
first report of injury. On cross examination, Mr. Coburn stated 
that he did not fill out an incident report on July 15, 1991 
because the applicant did not tell him the injury was industrially 
related. 
Diane Moore, the applicant's supervisor on July 15, 1991 
testified that she wasn't at work when the alleged accident 
occurred, but came to work at about 9:00 a.m. that day. The 
applicant came to her and told her that her shoulder and arm ached 
and she needed to go to the doctor. Prior to the date of the 
accident Ms. Moore and the applicant had discussed the applicant's 
shoulder pain which was attributed to arthritis. Ms. Moore further 
testified that she didn't fill out an incident report because the 
applicant did not say that she had suffered an industrial accident. 
On August 29, 1991, Gary Coburn called Ms. Moore and told her to 
help the applicant fill out an incident report for the alleged July 
15, 1991 industrial accident. 
We find that there is substantial evidence in the record to 
support the ALJ's findings on the credibility of witnesses and the 
compensability of the alleged industrial accident of July 15, 1991. 
The evidence in the record shows that the applicant complained of 
shoulder and arm pain on July 15, 1991 and left work to seek 
medical attention. Testimony of Jennie Featherstone, Penny 
Manchester, Greg Coburn, Diane Moore. The symptoms that the 
applicant attributes to the industrial accident were present before 
the alleged accident of July 15, 1991. Medical Records Exhibit, p. 
00027. The accident was not immediately reported as industrially 
caused and was not reported to the employer as an industrial 
accident until the claim for benefits based upon the applicant's 
April 16, 1991 industrial accident was denied. Testimony of Jennie 
Featherstone, Greg Coburn, Diane Moore. There were no witnesses to 
the alleged accident and the accident was not reported to any of 
the applicant's co-workers. Testimony of Jennie Featherstone, Greg 
Coburn, Diane Moore, Penny Manchester. The applicant's treating 
physician attributed her complaints to a recurrent condition for 
which she had previously sought treatment on June 20, 1991. 
Medical Records Exhibit, p. 00027. Therefore, the evidence in the 
record does not support a finding that the applicant was injured in 
a compensable industrial accident on July 15, 1991. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the Order of the administrative law judge 
dated November 30, 1992 is hereby affirmed. 




Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date of this order, pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, 63-46b-16, 
and Bonded Bicycle Couriers v. Dept. of Employment Security et a h , 
201 Utah Adv. Rep. 79. (CA, 12/04/92). The requesting party shall 
bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals 
purposes. Cv P\ 
Steph^h1 M. Ha 
aan 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
Certified t h i s ^ ^ day of ^ W ^ 1 9 9 3 
jfa^^J) (frzpz>. 
r 
Patricia O. As 
Commission Sec 
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This matter was remanded to the Industrial Commission 
("commission") by the Court of Appeals on October 28, 1993 for the 
limited purpose of determining whether petitioner has shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to compensation. 
The applicant filed a claim for workers7 compensation benefits 
based upon an alleged July 15, 1991 industrial accident. An 
administrative law judge of the commission ("ALJ") denied benefits 
based in part on credibility determinations he made at the hearing. 
We affirmed the ALJ's order based upon our determination that there 
was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. The Court of 
Appeals has held that we must apply the preponderance of the 
evidence standard in our review of administrative law judge ("ALJ") 
decisions*1 
We will now review the evidence in the record to determine 
whether the applicant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence 
that she suffered a compensable industrial accident on July 15, 
1993. 
DISCUSSION: 
Review of the medical records exhibit shows that the applicant 
had a history of shoulder pain prior to July 15, 1991, the date of 
the alleged industrial accident. Medical Records Exhibit, pp. 
00027, 00033, 00045, 00053, 00056, 00058, 00101, 00118, 00119, 
00122. Dr. Mark Greene, however, opined that the applicant's 
rotator cuff injury which has been attributed to the alleged July 
15, 1991 industrial accident, was different from the applicant's 
1987 shoulder pain and bursitis. Medical Records Exhibit, p. 
00001. 
The progress notes of Dr. David E. Curtis, the applicant's 
1
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treating physician, make reference to the applicant's "recurrent" 
right shoulder pain. Medical Records Exhibit, p. 00027. Dr. 
Curtis offered no opinion regarding the causal connection between 
the applicant's rotator cuff tear and her employment, although he 
did note that the applicant believed that her injury was associated 
with "more heavy work at her dishwashing job, especially taking 
care of the trays which come from the jail." Medical Records 
Exhibit, p. 00033. It is important to note that the applicant's 
medical records indicate that she suffered the pain, popping and 
grinding in her shoulder that she attributes to the industrial 
accident before the alleged accident occurred. Medical Records 
Exhibit, p. 00027. 
At the hearing, the applicant testified that on July 15, 1991, 
she picked up 12 serving trays to place them in the dishwasher and 
felt extreme pain "like her arm was being pulled out of the 
socket." She told Food Services Manager Greg Coburn that her arm 
hurt and she needed to go see her doctor. Later that day, the 
applicant saw her treating physician, Dr. Curtis. Dr. Curtis 
diagnosed a rotator cuff tear, but did not tell the applicant that 
the injury predated the July 15, 1991 incident. With regard to 
seeing Dr. Green for a second opinion, the applicant testified that 
he told her that the 1991 rotator cuff injury was different from 
her preceding shoulder problems. Dr. Green gave the applicant no 
recommended course of treatment that she could recall, but she 
testified that she "told him what she needed to have done and he 
did it." Hearing Tape # 1 at 1275. 
In addition, the applicant testified that she talked to Greg 
and her supervisor, Opal West, on July 15, 1991 after the alleged 
industrial accident. On cross examination, the applicant stated 
that she believed she had been treated for arthritis in her 
shoulder with cortisone shots prior to the accident. She testified 
that prior to July 15, 1991, she suffered from severe shoulder 
pain, popping and grinding. However, she didn't remember telling 
Dr. Curtis about the pain, grinding and popping during her June 20, 
1991 visit to the doctor. See Medical Records Exhibit at 00027. 
The applicant further testified that when she suffered an 
industrial injury to her low back in April 1991, she filled out an 
accident report and reported to the emergency room per hospital 
policy. On July 15, 1991, however, she claimed that her shoulder 
"hurt too much" and she didn't think about filling out an accident 
report or going to the emergency room. Instead, she left work 
early at about 9:00 a.m. to see her treating physician, Dr. Curtis. 
The applicant stated that she initially thought her shoulder pain 
was caused by arthritis, but later after she discovered there were 
torn ligaments, she decided the injury must have resulted from 
lifting the trays at work. 
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Diane Moore, the applicant's supervisor on July 15, 1991 
testified that she wasn't at work when the alleged accident 
occurred, but came to work at about 9:00 a.m. that day. The 
applicant came to her and told her that her shoulder and arm ached 
and she needed to go to the doctor. Prior to the date of the 
accident Ms. Moore and the applicant had discussed the applicant's 
shoulder pain which was attributed to arthritis. Ms. Moore further 
testified that she didn't fill out an incident report because the 
applicant did not say that she had suffered an industrial accident. 
On August 29, 1991, Gary Coburn called Ms. Moore and told her to 
help the applicant fill out an incident report for the alleged July 
15, 1991 industrial accident. 
The ALJ determined that the applicant was not credible based 
upon his observation of the witnesses and the inconsistencies 
between the applicant's testimony and the evidence contained in the 
medical records. The ALJ further found that Penny Manchester added 
no factual support to the applicant's case and that the applicant's 
husband was an antagonistic, biased and argumentative witness who 
was neither credible nor reliable. 
In Vali Convelescent and Care Institutions v. Div. of Health 
Care Financing, 797 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1990) , the Court of Appeals 
cited with approval an Idaho case dealing with credibility 
determinations by a hearing officer of an administrative agency. 
The Idaho court noted 
where credibility is crucial and where first-
hand exposure to the witnesses may strongly 
affect the outcome, we think the Personnel 
Commission should not override the hearing 
officer's impressions unless it makes a cogent 
explanation of its reasons for doing so. Such 
an explanation is essential to meaningful 
judicial review . . . 
Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Sandoval, 742 P. 2d 992, 996 (Ct. App. 
1987) cited in Vali at 449. 
We will only overturn an ALJ's findings of fact if there is a 
compelling reason to do so, especially when the factual issues turn 
on questions of witness credibility. In this case, we find no 
compelling reason to overrule the ALJ's findings of fact. We 
therefore conclude that the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law are well supported by a preponderance of the evidence in the 
record and hereby adopt them as our own. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
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For the reasons outlined above, we find that the applicant has 
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she injured 
her right shoulder in a compensable industrial accident on July 15, 
1991. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED t h a t t h e Order o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
law judge d a t e d November 3 0 , 1992 i s p h ^ r e b y a f f i r m e d . 
DATED THISN7ft DAY OF NOVEMBER, 
1993. 
3tepheTn/M. Hadlefy) 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
£££*_ 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
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